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In China there is a great gender imbalance, with men outnumbering women by 15%. This 
is a result of the One Child Policy which was enacted in 1979. At the same cultural moment, in 
1978, Deng Xiaoping initiated the Open Door Policy, which opened China’s economy to foreign 
investment. As the controlled market economy shifted to become more of a “free market”, this 
led to a breakdown of traditional Chinese family values that had been previously unchallenged. 
A historical trend that has remained present is women engaging in hypergamous marriages, in 
which women marry older, better-educated, and wealthier men. Simultaneously, as a result of the 
increased economic opportunities, more and more women are obtaining higher educational 
degrees, earning more money, and becoming financially independent. A modern trend, 
stigmatized by Chinese media, is the rise in “leftover women,” these high-achieving females who 
are unmarried and “unwanted.” The causes and factors behind these seemingly contradictory 
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trends have a correlated and interconnected effect on the future of Chinese urban society and 
women’s well-being. A historical framework is used to evaluate the effect of governmental and 
economic policies on modern society. Also, a combination of Chinese and Western sources 
brings a balanced perspective on Chinese culture and values in modern day. These seemingly 
contradictory forces of the oversupply of males and the increasing number of “leftover women” 
coexist under the influence of the One Child Policy instituted decades earlier. Governmental 
policies of the Chinese Communist Party affect the daily lives of the current generation of young 
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Modern marriage trends, including hypergamy, “leftover women,” and skewed gender 
ratios, are the result of a very complex combination of the One Child Policy (OCP), Open Door 
Policy (ODP), and traditional Chinese values. The collision of the continuation of certain 
traditional Chinese family values with the rise of Western values, including materialism and 
individualism presents a distinct challenge for modern Chinese men, women, and future families. 
These challenges include but are not limited to the difficulty in finding suitable partners, double 
standard of professional success and also conforming to traditional gender norms.  
 In the context of global studies, my research addresses current marriage trends in China 
and the extent to which they are the effect of specific past policies. I analyze the historical 
genealogy of the unique combination of four main factors; gender ratios, falling fertility rates, 
traditional values, and a change of women’s status in the context of contemporary China. In 
particular, my analysis focuses on the role that the OCP and ODP played in determining current 
social and demographic trends that characterize Chinese society. Other nations also have skewed 
gender ratios, falling fertility rates, and change of women’s status, yet the combination of these 
factors alongside other realities is special to China. The OCP and ODP are also exclusive to 
China, necessitating this to be a localized discussion to Chinese policies, demographics, and 
societal trends. However, it is beneficial to compare the current reality of nations who had 
similar initial population trends but did not implement equivalent policies to the OCP or ODP.  
 To assess these factors I evaluate different sources and scholars coming from unique 
fields of study to provide a well-rounded understanding of the polices, Chinese demographics, 
and cultural realities. I use a historical framework to evaluate the OCP, ODP, and other realities 
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in China from 1970 to the end of the 20th century. Regarding modern trends, I primarily utilize 
sociological and feminist frameworks. The scholars that I review use various lenses in addition 
to the historical framework to construct their understanding and evaluation of these policies and 
more significantly, how they have contributed to the current situation. A feminist framework 
evaluates trends through the lens of gender equality. The transdisciplinary approach includes 
sociology, family studies, anthropology, feminism, and Asian studies. Each scholar brings a 
particular combination of those fields into this discussion requiring consideration of their 
backgrounds.  
The transdisciplinary approach involving multiple fields requires a use of overlapping 
frameworks, including historical, sociological, and feminist frameworks, while I also use 
comparative analysis, to evaluate the scholars’ different backgrounds. The primary scholars’ 
articles I use are Yong Cai, Wang Feng, and Baochang Gu’s “Population, Policy, and Politics: 
How History Will Judge China’s One-Child Policy” (2012); Andrew Quach and Elaine 
Anderson’s “Implications of China’s Open-Door Policy for Families: A Family Impact 
Analysis” (2008); Yu Xie’s “Gender and Family in Contemporary China” (2013); Arianne 
Gaetano’s “Leftover women: Postponing Marriage and Renegotiating Womanhood in Urban 
China” (2014); Vanessa Fong’s “China’s One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban 




1. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Sociologist Yong Cai is a leading expert in Chinese social demography and offers a 
pivotal contribution to the understanding of the OCP. His findings guided a general consensus on 
the inaccuracy of the assumptions leading to the OCP, flawed conclusions on the effects of the 
policy, and that the fertility rate had actually decreased to levels below the replacement. This 
new consensus influenced the Chinese government to end the policy that had been in place for 
three decades. By ending, or adjusting the policy according to this new consensus, the CCP 
acknowledged Yong Cai’s findings that exposed the inadequacies in their approach to population 
control and the profound effects of the policy on the nation and future generations.  
Alongside Cai, Feng and Gu are both sociologists, at University of California Irvine and 
Renmin University respectively. All three scholars are Chinese but were educated at American 
universities, so their understanding of China is influenced by both their national background yet 
Western education. Their work reflects their multifaceted framework and understanding of 
Chinese policies from a western lens. They are not sympathetic to the Communist Party and offer 
a thorough critique of the OCP and its profound impact on Chinese society.  
 They analyze the motivations for the OCP, the validity of those reasons, the politics 
involved, and its continued legacy. They argue that although it was not as significant in 
controlling population growth, as other factors would accomplish the same goal, the long-term 
societal impact is underestimated. They are wary of the unimaginable effects of a nation of one-
child homes, socially, economically, and demographically. They affirm that the policy only 
persisted because of the nature of the CCP’s control and sovereignty. Their voices are a crucial 
contribution to this field as they examine the original purposes of the OCP.  
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Andrew Quach and Elaine Anderson- scholars in the field of family science at the 
University of Maryland, examine the under researched effects of the ODP on Chinese families in 
the article, “Implications of China’s Open-Door Policy for Families: A Family Impact Analysis”. 
Their background in family studies provides a novel evaluation of the OCP as their analysis is 
focused on the impact on families and changing family dynamics. The main argument is that the 
ODP affected employment, poverty rates, household composition, and family values, as it 
introduced Chinese families to other cultures, societies, values and opportunities. They claim that 
the ODP changed family responsibility, reduced family interdependence and increased 
independence, minimized significance of extended family, among other effects, many of which 
are still not yet understood. Their contributions are significant to understand the unintended 
social effects of an economic policy, as the impact of a policy always extends beyond its original 
focus. Likewise, the OCP had economic effects beyond its expected social impact.  
 Chinese American sociologist, Yu Xie, offers a combined framework of understanding 
Chinese culture, providing a very statistical analysis of trends, nuanced understanding of current 
trends in China from his diverse background. His main research interests are social stratification, 
demography, statistical methods, Chinese studies, and sociology of science. In his article, 
“Gender and Family in Contemporary China,” he evaluates the changes in China following the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. He assesses the departure from and 
continuation of traditional norms and values. These include filial piety, son preference, gender 
inequality, hypergamy, multi-generational co-residence. He links much of the changes in society 
to improvement of women’s socioeconomic status and increased individual consumption 
aspirations. His results from his statistical analysis challenge many assumptions surrounding 
current gender and marriage realities, including the impact of the imbalanced sex ratios. Xie 
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argues that the socioeconomic changes impact family, marriage, and gender dynamics most 
substantially. It will be discussed later whether this is linked to the OCP, ODP, or is simply 
correlated and not directly caused by either policy.  
 Sociologist and anthropologist, Arianne Gaetano, at Auburn University researches 
gender, migration, marriage, and their interrelation in China. Her field of study is directly 
applicable to this discussion as she studies the interwoven factors that affect modern gender roles 
and evolving marriage expectations and dynamics. In her article, “Leftover women: Postponing 
Marriage and Renegotiating Womanhood in Urban China,” she addresses the complex situation 
facing unmarried Chinese women who are achieving more than any previous generation of 
Chinese women, and yet if they remain unmarried are stigmatized as less valuable and feminine. 
Her background in China studies coupled with a feminist approach offers a critical eye to 
policies or cultural norms that inhibit women’s growth yet champions efforts to not conform to 
unnecessarily burdensome societal pressures. Although disapproving of the stigmatization of 
“leftover women,” she also is optimistic and hopeful regarding women’s renegotiation of 
womanhood, that benefits all of society. Different from the other scholars in this discussion, she 
employs personal interviews in her research with Chinese women to understand diverse stories 
and lived experiences of the women she studies in abstract. Her contributions are vital as it 
applies sociological and feminist frameworks to the modern reality lived by millions of Chinese 
women. She personalizes the discussion of impersonal policies and a vast population.  
Anthropologist Vanessa Fong applies anthropological, sociological, and psychological 
theories to her longitudinal studies of Chinese singleton children and how their childhood 
experiences have shaped their adult lives and personal decisions. Fong was born in Taiwan but 
immigrated with her family to America when she was three years old. She earned her PhD from 
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Harvard University. Fluent in Mandarin and still connected to her family’s background, yet 
educated and enculturated in America, she brings a unique transnational and culturally-blended 
perspective. She studies the trends from afar while also conducting her cohort study, providing a 
localized representation of the former findings. Her framework is a combination of feminism, 
anthropology, sociology, Asian studies, and family studies. Most notably are the first two, 
feminism and anthropology as those guide the latter. Amidst all of her research on families, she 
chose to develop her career at the exclusion of a family, as she believed it would be difficult to 
succeed at both. This is interesting to note and emphasizes her value of gender equality over 
traditional family roles.  
Her article, “China’s One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters” 
addresses the demographic shifts following the policy’s implementation and argues that 
daughters have benefited from receiving greater investment from their parents than before. Her 
research consisted of following a cohort of 2,273 singleton children from junior high to their 20s-
30s. Her cohort was not representative of the rural population, nor of highly elite classes, 
however represents a large majority of the Chinese population: low to middle income families 
with only one child. These families’ parents invest greatly in their one child so they can achieve 
high academic and career success. From her findings, Fong concludes that compared to previous 
generations, these daughters gained greater education opportunities, occupied a substantially 
larger number of jobs outside the domestic sphere, and were expected to continue their filial duty 
by providing for their parents in late age. This fundamentally shifted the traditional preference of 
sons over daughters and partial treatment of sons. Fong acknowledges the tragic consequences of 
the policy’s enforcement, but seeks to offer an alternative understanding of the OCP, focusing on 




The trends discussed in this paper are the gender ratio imbalance due to the OCP, 
hypergamous marriages, and leftover women. During the OCP, sex-selected abortions led to 
approximately 30 million more men than women, with the largest imbalance being in the 
youngest generation and marriageable age generation.  In China the hypergamous trend has been 
perpetuated for many generations. It is common and expected for younger women of lower 
education level, socioeconomic status to marry men who are older, better educated, and 
wealthier. “Leftover women'' (sheng nü) is a term used to describe women “deemed increasingly 
unmarriageable due to their advancing age—starting from their mid-20s, and perceived 
unfeminine natures'' (Gaetano, 124). It began to be propagated by the media in early 2000s and 
has become common vernacular. It is perceived in a multitude of ways by the women who are 
labeled as such and is surrounded by a multitude of cultural norms that will be further explored 
later. Yet at the same time the traditional values and pressures are put on bachelor men, including 
the expectation for men to provide material wealth before being eligible for marriage. The key 
terms that should be noted are One Child Policy (OCP); Open-Door Policy (ODP); hypergamy; 
leftover women; women’s status, referring to the general trends in education, income, material 
achievement achieved by women in modern China; filial piety; CCP, the Chinese Communist 
Party.  
I will review the previously stated scholars’ work, their main arguments, and evaluate the 
claims they make and their overlapping contributions and contradictions. I begin with the ODP 
and Quach and Anderson’s article, followed by the OCP. In both sections I evaluate the policies’ 
intentional and unintentional effects on Chinese society and demographics. From there, I analyze 
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the different cultural factors and traditional values that co-exist to produce certain gender and 
marriage outcomes. Finally, I address the stigmatization and experience of “leftover women”. 
Throughout the paper I compare and contrast the various scholars’ arguments to evaluate the 






3.1 Open Door Policy  
The Reform and Open Door Policy (gai ge ke fang), an economic policy implemented 
around the same time as the OCP, affected families more profoundly than initially suspected. 
Family policies exist to alleviate societal problems and the OCP’s main goal was to curb China’s 
growing population and its anticipated repercussions. A year after the OCP’s implementation, 
China's Marriage Law underwent several revisions liberalizing divorce and giving women more 
rights in that process, including property distribution favoring women. Quach and Anderson 
explain the research findings from various sources on the effects of the OCP including, the 
“increases in parental involvement in the lives of children and some gender bias favoring boys to 
girls related to parental care” and simultaneously a rise in divorce rates (Quach, et al. 1090). The 
marriage laws created a more “equal” society, empowering women to be equal contributors in 
marriages. This is an interesting parallel implementation of family policies, and both policies 
inadvertently gave more power and persuasive power to women. Wives, the mothers of the first 
generation of singleton children, were now empowered to divorce and address the systemic 
issues in marriage that had been present for generations. These singleton daughters were now 
being raised in family contexts that validated their role in society as women and were receiving 
more investment from their parents– emotionally, financially, etc. These trends will be discussed 
in greater detail later when presenting Fong’s contributions to the field.   
The OCP is clearly a family policy, yet even the ODP directly affects families. Anderson 
and Quach quote a leading scholar in family studies, Bogenschneider, whose research focuses on 
policies’ impacts on families. Her research reveals that economic policies impact families much 
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more substantially than expected. Also, the consequences are often unforeseen. The ODP “can be 
considered family friendly in that it strove to enhance a family’s capacity to help itself and others 
by improving the financial status of the country during a severe economic depression 
(Bogenschneider, 2006; Yeung & Sung, 1996)” (Quach, 1090). The ODP was instituted to 
improve the nation’s trade and industry, which in turn, advanced families’ financial status. Their 
findings challenge Feng’s analysis because Quach and Anderson emphasize the positive effects 
and motivations of the ODP and how together with the one child policy, they benefited Chinese 
families and allowed for the overall progressive growth of society. Within the families, women, 
both mothers and daughters, profited most substantially as these policies contributed to their rise 
in social status and contributions to society. This was unprecedented in Chinese history. Under 
Mao, women were given more responsibility as equal citizens, but advancement in economic 
opportunities were not made available to women.     
The ODP increased jobs and services available to families, including factories in rural 
China providing more employment opportunities for men and women. The government had more 
financial strength to help families and provide better housing, healthcare, and food resources. 
Quach and Anderson write:  
Even though the goal of the Open Door Policy was to restore China’s economic status, 
the program directly affected families and their monetary problems by improving their 
financial security, lifting many out of their impoverishment and helping to improve their 
mental, physical, and emotional health. The Open Door Policy can be viewed as a tacit 
family policy, in that it was constructed in a manner to profoundly affect families in 
China even if not initially created with families or family policy in mind. The Open Door 
Policy was the government’s answer to several family problems, and the programs and 
ideas implemented by this economic policy brought tremendous revenue into the country 
and helped to reduce a lot of the poverty in China. (1093) 
 
         Consequently, within the family structure support and responsibilities changed. The ODP 
stimulated the economy, increased employment and led to higher salaries, so parents could better 
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care for their children and the elderly in their kinship network. This allowed children to begin at 
a more advantageous position than any generation before in Chinese history. Quach and 
Anderson cite Tsui and Yi, who are both reputable family studies scholars. Tsui’s work is 
referenced from “Changes in Chinese Urban Family Structure. Journal of Marriage and 
Family”. Yi is quoted from his work titled, “A Demographic Analysis of Family Households in 
China, 1982-1995. Journal of Comparative Family Studies”. From their works, Quach and 
Anderson conclude that Chinese families were introduced to the “idea of individualism, which 
focuses less on doing what is good for the family and more on what is beneficial for the 
individual (Tsui, 1989; Yi, 1996)” (Quach, et al. 1094). This opposed the traditional value of 
collectivism and family responsibility. But as families could earn more, parents were better 
equipped to support their children and provide more advanced opportunities for them, which was 
revolutionary, but especially for daughters. Before this, succeeding and earning more was not 
much of an option, so individualism was of no real value to personal advancement. However, as 
this shifted, the whole society benefited economically. In comparison though, the daughters 
gained substantial advantage, resulting in increased gender equality.  
This is due to the fact that traditionally, higher paying and more respectable or 
prestigious jobs were occupied only by men, and women were limited to the domestic realm of 
jobs. Yet, as diverse employment opportunities increased and the influx of western values, 
women were given more access to opportunities beyond the traditional domestic sphere. The 
ODP adjusted the cultural landscape as it increased the total number of jobs available and higher 
education opportunities, enabling women to begin to aspire for more. From 1978 to 1995, female 
labor force participation rate increased from 32.9% to 39.4% and has only increased since 
(Quach, et al., 1095). Quach and Anderson claim that “filial piety has less influence on Chinese 
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children now than before the implementation of the ODP” (1096). Integral to this discussion is 
the claim that ODP, specifically the introduction of Western values, has led to the elevation of 
women’s status and shifted the power dynamic, giving more power to women in and outside the 
family.  
Arguably, this did not eradicate the traditional value of filial piety but expanded the 
responsibility of caring for the elderly beyond just the sons, which Gaetano and Fong would 
agree with. Daughters and mothers are increasingly responsible for their family kin networks, as 
they hold more equal positions throughout the rest of society. The advancement in education and 
jobs also led to women being expected to be equal contributors. At the same time, there appears 
to be a double standard in that women are equal contributors– both in reality and in familial 
expectations, yet in some aspects are still confined to the traditional understanding of their roles.  
Most notably, the double standard contains the continued expectation for women to 
engage in hypergamous marriages. As women’s status continually rises, or becomes more equal 
with men, either men need to proportionately rise in society, the expectation for hypergamous 
marriages adapts, or the “advanced” women remain unmarried. This is discussed more later 
regarding Gaetano’s work.  
3.2 Origins and Consequences of the One Child Policy  
After the demise of Mao Ze Dong as the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, 
Deng Xiao Ping became the head of the country in 1978. He instituted many reforms to loosen 
the country’s original restrictive, isolated, communistic policies to become more open to the rest 
of the world. This entailed foreign investment as Western economic institutions could now 
establish a presence in China and begin to develop their consumer base. This also started to open 
up China’s export sector to the rest of the world, leading to major financial growth for the entire 
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country. This transformed China’s focus from Mao’s industrial production for domestic use to 
mobilizing the population to generate real output for exports. Following Mao’s death, the 
population continued to grow as he encouraged families to have many children to increase the 
nation’s willpower for industrial production. The rising numbers were being perceived as a 
growing threat to the wellbeing of the nation and perceived success of the government. There is a 
broad range of views on the true motives behind the OCP and even more diversity of conclusions 
regarding its effects. Outside of China, most scholars acknowledge there were fertility planning 
programs already in place before the implementation of the OCP. These original fertility 
planning programs technically required voluntary cooperation but were in fact quite coercive. 
There is also a shared understanding of the inconsistencies in the enforcement of the OCP based 
on rural or urban and the Han majority versus other ethnic minorities. These all reflect the CCP’s 
general attitudes towards the different population segments and their ability to control the 
population without accountability or justification.  
Yong Cai, Wang Feng and Baochang Gu analyze the different forces contributing to the 
OCP and the political motivations of the national government. They claim that the CCP’s 
motives were deeper than mere population control, but rather to achieve political end goals, such 
as garnering political legitimacy and laying the foundational sovereignty of the CCP. Feng 
writes:  
The measure used to gauge its success in increasing living standards of the population 
was per capita GDP growth. With this new mandate and focus, controlling population 
growth became a critical component of this legitimacy. In 1982, birth control was 
announced as a “basic state policy” (jiben guoce). (118) 
 
Feng also notes three forces in the Chinese political system that contributed to the 
unquestioned legitimization of the one-child policy. These include a “statist tradition and 
bureaucratic institutions that treat individual citizens as subjects of the state; a post-revolutionary 
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regime that places birth control at the heart of its political legitimacy; and a policymaking 
process that is carried out among political elites shrouded with secrecy and lacking public 
scrutiny” (Feng, et al. 118). Other scholars in this discussion inevitably interact with these three 
forces as the CCP’s sovereignty is intricately woven into the fabric of society and the everyday 
lives of families and individuals.  
From an outside perspective, not living under the CCP’s authority, these three forces are 
clearly visible. Therefore, their connection to the policies is an evident connection. The statist 
tradition is firmly entrenched by the establishment of the CCP due to Mao’s leadership and 
intrusive policies. The Cultural Revolution, spearheaded by Mao and the CCP, eradicated any 
questioning of the government and upheld subservience to authority and conformity to the 
general masses as second nature. Policies that intruded into the very lives of families were not 
new at the implementation of the OCP. Throughout the 20th century, the CCP established several 
laws that affected family structure, family duties, the marriage law, and the daily lives of 
individuals. Furthermore, the massive bureaucratic institutions and all of their processes group 
the public nation together as a collective entity rather than a collection of individuals. Yet, new 
to the ‘70s and ‘80s was that the regime was no longer in a mindset of perpetuating revolution, 
but was establishing political legitimacy post-revolution, placing birth control at the center of 
that. Continuing the statist tradition, the policymaking process lacks public accountability or 
discussion and assumes total submission from the people. These forces established at the 
beginning of the CCP during Mao’s leadership continued to shape the trajectory of the political 
system that led to drastic policies affecting individual lives that compose the nation state.  
Feng is correct in that China established an unparalleled policy of population growth 
control. Yet at the same time, many nations were experiencing similar phenomena and were 
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implementing different types of policies. Wei Huang, a researcher from the National University 
of Singapore notes that “in the mid-1990s, large-scale family planning programs were active in 
115 countries” (Huang, 2). Wei Huang’s findings challenge Feng’s assertions of the OCP’s total 
penetration into all of Chinese society, because although the policy was mandatory and 
implemented across the nation, “the birth quota varied according to residence (urban/rural) and 
ethnicity (Han/non-Han)” (Huang, 3). Rural and minority groups were impacted less by the 
policy as it was enforced with less severity. The CCP had the type of power to establish the OCP, 
and also to enforce it in various measures according to them. There was no public outcry to the 
inconsistency or unfairness.  
The motives of the CCP are consistent across all sectors of society; economic, political, 
social. The CCP intends to maintain power and social order through social submission. This 
makes the one child policy less significant in light of the CCP’s general aims. The CCP’s 
assertion of its total authority is visible even in its varied implementation, treating various 
demographics differently regarding the policy. This is shown by the variance in local 
governments fines imposed for violations of the policy.    
In the decade of the 1970s, “China’s total fertility rate dropped by more than half, from 
5.8 in 1970 to 2.8 in 1979. Most of the births averted [after the implementation of the one-child 
policy], if any, were due to the rapid fertility decline of that decade, not to the one-child policy 
that came afterward” (Feng, et al. 121). Other countries that had similar birth rates to China in 
the 1970s without the one-child policy resulted in having a birth rate below the level predicted 
for China. The baby boom was a global trend following World War II, but the OCP was unique 
to China. In contrast with China’s government intervention, other nations saw a natural decline 
in their fertility rates. The most substantial consequence of China’s one child policy was not the 
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declining birth rate, as many other countries experienced similar trends, but rather the unintended 
effects on Chinese families' kinship structure. Other unexpected results included “physical abuse, 
sex-selective abortion, and a risk of a depressed fertility level that could lead to irreversible 
population aging, labor shortage, and economic slowdown and stagnation” (Feng et al. 120). The 
sex-selected abortions came from the traditional values of valuing sons over daughters, because 
daughters once married would join the husband’s family and would be unable to support her 
aging parents. 
This policy narrowly focused on family planning profoundly affected society both 
broadly and deeply. The OCP not only led to a gender imbalance, but changed the structure of 
Chinese society and molded traditional values and families to conform to the new reality of a 
one-child family unit. The aging population outnumbers the younger generation resulting in 
increased pressure for the adult children to provide for their aging parents, due to the continued 
traditional value of filial piety. Arguably, the oversupply of bachelors, disproportionate aging 
population, and persistence of traditional family values did not alleviate pressures but added 
burdens and expectations for daughters to achieve more, provide more, and marry well to secure 
provisions for elderly parents. However, embedded in those familial pressures is a crucial change 
in women’s status. Prior to the OCP, sons would be treated preferentially. Anthropologist Fong 
highlights, despite the societal pressures facing the young adult generation, that urban daughters 
benefited substantially from the OCP.  
She notes that a region’s fertility rate is typically directly correlated to its economic 
development. In her estimation, a modern economy is characterized by urban areas being the 
main place of residence, children consume more than they put out, mothers and fathers work jobs 
incompatible with child-rearing at home, and education is extensively available to both genders, 
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paving the road to future success. Traditionally in China, gender inequality was differentiated by 
men’s superior public sphere roles with women occupying subordinate domestic sphere roles. 
Yet, due to the ODP and decreased fertility rates from the OCP, women dedicate themselves to 
work and education instead of motherhood. The group that benefits the most, according to Fong, 
is the daughters born to low-fertility mothers, since they are socialized to value educational and 
career success in the new modern, developed economy. The generation of singleton daughters 
following the OCP received greater parental investment and thus began the “transformation of 
their society’s kinship system from a patrilineal, patrilateral, and patrilocal one to a bilineal, 
bilateral, and neolocal one,” because “paid work enabled women to provide their own parents 
with financial support in old age and thus, prove that daughters could be as filial as sons” (Fong, 
1101). In a society that values filial piety, the ability to care for one’s aging parents is a sign of 
financial well-being, personal responsibility, and reflects well on the family in the community. In 
1949, motivated to mobilize the female portion of the labor population, the CCP provided 
employment opportunities for women, yet women were too restricted by their childbearing 
responsibility to attain much financial success. The OCP changed that as parents had to invest in 
their child, regardless of gender, for their own future stability. Fong articulates the complexity as 
such: 
Parents whose love, hope and need for old-age support are all pinned on just one child  
tend to do whatever is necessary to make that child happy and successful, regardless of 
the child’s gender. Daughters and their parents face the extra challenge of winning and 
happiness and success in a society structured by gender norms that have long 
disadvantaged women. They meet this challenge with a strategic combination of 
conformity and resistance. For academically unsuccessful daughters of poor parents, 
gender norms provide a means of upward mobility through marriage and job markets 
unavailable to their male counterparts. Women face a glass ceiling produced by their 
extra burden of domestic responsibility, by gender norms that favor men in elite 
professions and by inequalities between elite husbands and their less elite, hypergamous 
wives. Women also enjoy the protection of a glass floor created by the hypergamous 
marriage system, by gender norms that favor nonelite women in the educational system, 
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and by the rapidly expanding market for feminine jobs in the service and light industry 
sectors. (1102) 
 
Women’s combined strategy of conformity and resistance is necessary in order to achieve 
economic success, fulfill family obligations, and attain personal satisfaction. Conformity 
includes continuing the traditional values like caring for aging parents and contributing to the 
collective kinship network. Resistance, as Gaetano also writes about, means challenging the 
terms of womanhood and happiness that have been assumed for so long. Yu Xie and Gaetano 
also touch on the dynamic continued roles as wives and daughters, but also the reconfiguration of 




4. SHIFTING GENDER DYNAMICS 
4.1 Cultural Factors  
Yu Xie, in “Gender and Family in Contemporary China” explains the changes to and 
continuation of traditional practices of gender norms and family. These shifts include women’s 
rise in socioeconomic status, increase in premarital cohabitation and divorce, the elderly 
depending on both sons and daughters for support, as well as the continued traditional 
expectation for wives’ main contribution to be domestic responsibilities, multi-generational 
cohabitation, and significant preference for sons. Xie does not directly correlate it to the ODP, 
but notes externally, “in recent years, rapid economic development and the associated high 
consumption aspirations have exerted economic pressures on young persons entering marriage” 
(Xie, 2). This reveals the collision of traditional values, expectations, and roles, intermingling 
with the rise in women’s status and gender equality. Is this collision a result of the CCP’s 
policies or did the effects of these policies merely reveal trends that would manifest regardless, 
due to the change in times? What causes women to be simultaneously elevated and held back, 
both promoted and punished for their advancement?  
Xie argues that the answer lies in the historical importance of family lineage in which 
individuals are valued for the role they play as temporary carriers of the family line and ancestral 
lineage. As noted previously, sons have historically been valued over daughters not because of 
any characteristic besides they return the investment their parents put into them. In this family 
system, sons are permanent members of their natal family and retain life-time financial 
relationships with their parents. They are expected to contribute to their parents’ economic 
stability even after they are married themselves. Thus, it is in their self-interest for parents to 
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invest in sons because they may reap long-term returns from this investment. In contrast, 
daughters are only temporary members of their natal families before marriage, upon which a 
woman serves her husband’s extended family. Thus, due to the limited time during which 
daughters serve their natal families, parents often extract resources from unmarried daughters, 
for example in terms of remittances from daughters’ market labor or housework, to improve the 
family budget and invest in sons. This has evolved as brotherless daughters now must provide for 
their aging parents and share the responsibility of filial duty.   
Outside of the home, women have been gaining greater socioeconomic status and 
educational attainment yet experiencing continued disparity in income and unequal share of 
household responsibilities. Because of this dualistic expectation, women are arguably not fully 
maximizing their potential contributions to the labor market. Their increased socioeconomic 
status has resulted in an older median age of marriage for women. Despite this increased median 
age, status hypergamy, a traditional practice in China, remains in practice in contemporary 
society. There has been an increase in love-based marriages, away from parent-arranged. This is 
arguably due to the ODP’s introduction of other cultural values, including romantic relationships 
and understanding of marriage. Xie claims that since women are closing the educational gap, 
hypergamy is not as easily achieved through educational standards, but now there is a “trend of 
increases in the age gap between husband and wife so as to allow prospective husbands to 
accumulate more economic resources than prospective wives of similar education” (Xie, 5).  
As gender equality rises, the continued expectation for men to hold higher positions or 
earn more has placed unique pressures on men in the marriage market. Economic factors have 
increasingly become an important factor in getting married, especially housing prices. As men 
compete for brides, financial stability becomes a key part in being an attractive prospective 
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spouse. While it may be due to the imbalance sex ratios, Xie links it to broad and diverse factors 
like continued hypergamy, women’s improved socioeconomic status, and greater consumption 
aspirations. Arguably, this pressure of attaining financial success in order to be considered as a 
viable lifelong mate is not new but rather from family pressure, a direct implication of traditional 
filial piety. This pressure to achieve personal financial stability may be present in multiple 
cultural contexts, but is unique to the modern Chinese context as the pressure originates from 
parents’ need for their children to have more financial stability to care for them as they age. 
Furthermore, parents put pressure on their adult children to get married not for reasons 
of personal happiness, but rather for the sake of the family “saving face”, another traditional 
Chinese concept of an honor and shame culture that is perpetuated in the modern experience. 
Hypergamy stems from this too, as men would “lose face” and discredit their family’s reputation 
if they were to marry women who are older, wealthier, or better educated than themselves. Thus, 
the two segments of population that are at the opposite ends of the spectrum and experience 
difficulty in finding a spouse are men with little education and highly educated women (Xie, 6).  
The family pressure to find a spouse is magnified by the responsibilities once married. It 
is common practice for multi-generational families to live together in the same house. In 2012, 
43 percent of elderly persons aged 60 above lived with a child, 31 percent have a child living in 
the same neighborhood, and 13 percent more in the same county (Xie, 6). Since the traditional 
Chinese family is patrilineal and patrilocal, a high number of the elderly prefer or expect to live 
with their adult children and/or receive financial help. These pressures continue and weigh on the 
singleton child more heavily than if the family had multiple children to share the responsibility. 
Chinese adults are fully aware of the responsibilities they assume when entering upon marriage, 
which is arguably a factor in the delayed marriage ages. As the nation’s economy continues to 
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develop and individual consumerism increases, marriage becomes more of an option than a 
requirement for financial stability, especially for women.  
4.2 Combination of Traditional Values and Changing Modern Socioeconomic Realities  
When policies are introduced to improve gender equality, it ironically places a double 
burden on women to act as men’s equals in public society, while also continuing to be the main 
contributor in private. For example, “The New Marriage Law'' implemented by Mao Ze Dong in 
1950 eliminated a great deal of hierarchical and traditional gender norms from ancient Chinese 
history. It gave women a new equal status in the marriage relationship, including equal duty, 
rights, and option for divorce. This was a pivotal moment in Chinese history that allowed women 
to be viewed as equals, or as “comrades'' that were a vital component to the flourishing of 
society. The law revised the status of concubines from “minor wives” and made concubinage a 
“de facto marriage” (Yun). Mao’s Cultural Revolution brought women into the public sphere and 
elevated the significance of their contributions. However, women were encouraged to grow their 
roles in public spheres, they often had to continue to tend to roles traditionally relegated to 
women such as taking care of elders, cooking and cleaning, and raising children. In essence, 
Mao’s statement of equality represented a double bind, forcing women to actually hold up far 
more than half the sky, as Maggie Wedeman writes in her article “Mapping Gender Onto the 
Cultural Revolution: Masculinity's Triumph in a 'Genderless' Struggle”.  
This double standard has arguably continued and taken new forms as women are 
attaining higher levels of education and income, and yet are still expected to fulfill certain family 
obligations and gender roles. Gaetano articulates these realities experienced by modern Chinese 
women, to attain high levels of education and career growth yet to conform to the traditional 
expectations of hypergamous marriages.  
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4.3 Leftover Women 
Gaetano explores the differing experiences and ongoing pressures of women in modern 
China despite professional and personal advancement. Fong noted their advanced socioeconomic 
status as merely positive, for the women themselves and society as a whole, which is agreed 
upon from a Western and feminist perspective. Yet, as Gaetano notes, these social advancements 
can come at a personal cost in romantic relationships, due to the persistent traditional values and 
societal pressures to conform to those values regarding marriage. Gaetano also explains the 
Chinese media’s portrayal of these women combined with the cultural understanding of these 
women who are advancing. A contributor to The Economist writes, in “Married to the 
Mortgage”:  
Women, especially "A-quality" women, who do not marry early often do not marry at 
all. Indeed, women over 30 who boast a university education have even lower marriage 
rates than poorly educated, similarly aged men who lack a high-school education. This 
"marriage squeeze" impels women to try to marry before they turn 27. The pressure to do 
so is far greater than the pressure men feel to provide a home, argues Leta Hong Fincher, 
a PhD student at Tsinghua University. Eventually, the compulsion to marry early 
outweighs the wish to marry well. (Economist)  
 
  In the marriage market, Chinese males technically are at a disadvantage, due to gender 
imbalance ratio and pressure to get married and provide for their families. According to 
Gaetano’s research, up to 10% of Chinese men born after 1980 are or will become “bare sticks:” 
“lifelong bachelors without offspring” (Gaetano, 125). Yet surprisingly, “a larger proportion of 
women than men remain unmarried after age 30, and the likelihood of marriage for women 
decreases significantly with increased education levels” (Gaetano, 125). Urban Chinese women’s 
rising education levels, as Fong points out, was a positive outcome of the OCP. Simultaneously, 
there are cultural expectations and gender norms that stifle the matching of highly educated 
women with potential male spouses. Related to hypergamy, “men prefer to marry someone 
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slightly younger and having equal or less education than themselves, who is attractive and has a 
good personality” (Gaetano, 125). Gaetano finds that according to this criterion and the current 
reality of China’s urban demographics, “women characterized by so-called “three highs” (high 
levels of education, high income, and advancing age) are distinctly disadvantaged” (Gaetano, 
125).  
The question is, should this lead Chinese women to have lower personal and professional 
aspirations in order to attract a future husband? Should Chinese men change their expectations? 
Is something innately wrong or is society adjusting to new normals and new trends? And do 
these women, who are achieving more and are becoming increasingly independent, care or are 
they indifferent to difficulty in finding a mate? Has the media, and or parents’ expectations and 
traditional values, exasperated, or exaggerated, the negativity of this situation?  
Gaetano blames the media for beginning and bringing attention to this trend of “leftover 
women” and for labeling single women as “being too fickle, too materialistic, self-centered, and 
generally unrealistic in their expectations of marriage” (Gaetano, 126). The media circulated not 
only these negative stereotypes but also sexist and misogynist jokes, including the following 
example: “the world has three types of humans: Men, Women, and Female PhDs,” suggesting 
that such highly educated women are extremely aberrant” (Gaetano, 126). Even in circles of 
women, namely the “official organization for Chinese women, the All-China Women’s 
Federation, warned women that they must marry by age 27,” otherwise becoming “leftover 
women” and thus forever unmarriable. (126)  
What is at risk, as Gaetano reveals, is not only the well-being of these women and their 
own personal happiness, but also the symbolic nature of the family unit and its reproduction of 
social stability. Fong links advancement of women to the advancement of society, which is true. 
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But also, family units, not just individuals, contribute to the flourishing of society, as a “building 
block for the modern-nation state, as the producer of citizenry and of labor” (Gaetano, 126). 
Gaetano does not subscribe to this sentiment but does recognize the significance of the family 
unit and the role of marriage within that. Even more than seeking women’s elevated status, 
Gaetano is most inflamed about the unnecessary and negative stereotypes of these “leftover 
women” as being less valuable women.   
Despite the presumably harmful effects, at the same time, through her interviews and 
research, she finds a profound ambivalence about marriage among the women. Instead of 
prioritizing romantic love, these women have a broader understanding of the “good life,” 
entailing financial security and romantic love marked by autonomous spouse selection, and an 
“egalitarian, companionate-style marriage” (Gaetano, 124).  Instead of pursuing marriage as their 
main goal or completely dismissing it, these women are renegotiating the terms of marriage with 
new expectations. This is a key way they resist the media’s critical stereotype. As their terms 
change, societal understanding of marriage changes form to accommodate the shift in women’s 
significance in society.  
As mentioned before, in China there is a double standard for women to fulfill traditional 
motherly roles yet also achieve higher degrees and be financially secure. Typically, women 
making gains in education and employment delay marriage, as is the case in China too. In 2012 
in China, the proportion of women earning Bachelors and Masters degrees exceeded the 
proportion of men. If women are achieving more, hypergamy, “leftover women,” and other 
cultural norms seemingly have to adjust. Gaetano argues that the term “leftover women” is a 
conservative reaction to the advancement of women and general social changes, in a society 
accustomed to men holding superior positions to women for thousands of years. Despite their 
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overall advancement, there are still legal restrictions such as the retirement age which is lower 
for women than men. This harms women’s job promotions and overall life earnings. Gaetano 
notes an obvious but crucial point: 
The experiences and perspectives of unmarried professional women in urban China are 
diverse and complex. Importantly they are not all succumbing to official pressure on so-
called “leftover women” by rushing into unequal marriages, or marrying for money rather 
than for love, or lowering their expectations of a spouse. Most women in my study 
adhered to firm expectations of egalitarian companionate marriage, honed through rich 
past history of dating or divorce, as well as by contrasting to friends’ unsatisfactory 
relationships. A few were contemplating marriage to men who did not meet normative 
criteria of the ideal spouse in terms of looks or status, but who were likely to meet more 
important criteria of mutual affection, compatibility, and respect. Some women in my 
study were already over age 35, and increasingly unlikely and even unwilling to marry. 
The women’s accounts are also similar in that they all express ambivalence toward 
marriage. Their attitude indicates the tensions and contradictions of women confronted 
with numerous opportunities and choices, and new expectations and desires, including for 
both successful and fulfilling careers and marriages, which are not easily attained within 
a patriarchal environment. In contemporary china, femininity implies traits like being 
“tender” and nurturing, which reinforce a normative womanhood grounded in domestic 
roles and asymmetrical gender relations. Their stories illustrate the lack of social 
acceptance and support for single women in contemporary China. Yet these women are 
independent, confident, and intelligent. They are constructing meaningful lives by 
attaining educational and career goals, building social networks, and playing important 
social roles in their families of origin and elsewhere. Their refusal to conform to rigid 
gender prescriptions or compromise their aspirations implicitly challenges patriarchal 
constraints. (145-146)  
  
Fong’s argument is that these women were invested in and that is why these changes 
occur, Gaetano argues that this is a choice they are making to resist the modern experience of 





The ODP and OCP, implemented around the same time, have had direct implications on 
decreased fertility rates, increased materialism via widespread economic growth, skewed gender 
ratio, and women earning and achieving more. From a cultural understanding, Chinese families 
still esteem filial piety, saving face, and hypergamy. Simultaneously, materialism, individualism, 
and an expectation to achieve and earn more have all risen. These arguably stem from the ODP’s 
expansion of China’s economy, foreign investment, and also the increased investment into 
daughters as a result of the OCP. The term “leftover women,” due to continued hypergamy point 
to the continuation of traditional values. Depending on the lens used, feminist or family studies, 
these policies and marriage trends can be seen as beneficial or harmful, respectively. Analyzing 
these trends causes one to question the lens through which equality, marriage, and family values 
are understood and judgements are based. Is material success or family growth seen as the 
highest aim in society, or are they mutually exclusive? To what extent did the One Child Policy 
alter societal values and priorities within the family unit? How do women, or those subjected to 
certain expectations, conform to, resist, or subvert these pressures and stereotypes? How has this 
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